Approved For Release 2007/06/14 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001604120002-1

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

82-13310/3

10 December 1982

The Honorable William P. Clark Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

In view of priority the President attaches to strengthening counterintelligence, perhaps you can weigh in with Dave on this decision to significantly retard FBI's ability to come from behind on its ability to cover the growing and aggressive Soviet Bloc espionage and technology acquisition efforts in the United States.

Yours,

Pich

William J. Casey

Enclosure (ER 82-13312/2, dated 10 Dec 82)

Prepared by DCI/Distribution on 10 Dec 82


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
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# Approved For Release 2007/06/14 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001604120002-1 The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505



10 DEC 1982

The Honorable David A. Stockman Director, Office of Management and Budget Washington, D.C. 20503

#asirrington, v.t. 20503	
Dear Dave:	
As you are aware, one of the main objectives of this Administration is to improve and strengthen the current counterintelligence/countermeasures capabilities of the Intelligence Community.	25X1
One of my immediate concerns is the need to increase the Federal Bureau of Investigation/Foreign Counterintelligence (FBI/FCI) manpower and technical capabilities to deal with the increased hostile threat in the United States. For example, in FY 1982, the FBI/FCI program had high priority cases which should have been worked on a one-agent-to-one-case basis. Due to manpower constraints, these cases were handled on an average of one-agent-to-three-case basis. In FY 1983, our request to increase the FBI/FCI program by	25X1
was denied by OMB. Congress is attempting to provide these positions. In FY 1984, 'I have recommended an additional increase of and significant increases in funds to support the FBI/FCI program.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
As evidenced by the recent OMB passback to the Department of Justice, your office appears prepared to support this increase, but would offset this by any increase Congress approves in FY 1983. I believe this offset should not be imposed because it would prevent us from achieving the full build-up over the two years which I consider essential to adequately cope with the sharply increased activity of the Soviet Bloc and Cuban espionage services within the United States.	25X1
I have expressed my concern to Judge Clark regarding OMB's decision on this matter and he supports my view that any increases approved by Congress for FY 1983 should be additive to the FY 1984 request.	25X1
Overall, I believe we are building improved CI capabilities at a pace that prudent management and the complexities of the problem will sustain. Any increases for the FBI/FCI program should be accompanied by raising the overall allowance within the Department of Justice and should not be at the expense of other programs within the Department.	25X1
	25X1

Given the high priority the President places on the strengthening of our counterintelligence effort, I would hope you could agree to this increase for it necessary.

Sincerely,

William J. Casey



### OEXA 82-2751/1

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA:	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	• .
FROM:	Director, Office of External Affairs	STAT
SUBJECT:	Request for DCI Appearance - Senate Select Committee on Intelligence	
	Color Color Color Color	
Committee on Into to appear before in S-407, The Cap	committee on Budget Authorization of the Senate Select elligence has invited you, Judge Webster, and General Stilwell the Subcommittee at 10:00 a.m., on Thursday, 16 December 1982, pitol. The purpose of the hearing is to "examine topics of to the review of the Fiscal Year 1984 budget request for FCI	•
explore policy is presence is neces General Stilwell	as advised us that Chairman Malcolm Wallop really wants to ssues in the counterintelligence area, and feels that your ssary for a complete discussion. Judge Webster and both have scheduling conflicts on the day in question, a them and join you should you decide to attend.	
desire, due to tl	feels that this topic can better be addressed in . Rob Simmons has reiterated Chairman Wallop's personal he Community nature of this issue, that it be done now e the presentation.	STAT
		STAT
DCI APPROVED: <u>Contau</u> Dir	affrond orally 142/82.  Hochstert Stilveld. USB 12/6/82  rector of Central Intelligence Date	STAT
DISAPPROVE: Di	rector of Central Intelligence Date	
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SUBJECT: Topic for Discussion at DCI Meeting with Judge Clark, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, on 15 December 1982

## Possible Military Unrest in Aftermath of Executions in Suriname

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1. The political situation in Suriname remains fluid. Shock and outrage grow as news of the brutal executions of leading citizens becomes known. On the afternoon of 13 December, a crowd estimated at over 5,000 persons gathered in a local cemetery to pay their last respects at the burial of several civilian leaders. Spontaneous singing of hymns occurred. The crowd was tense. Military forces reportedly kept a low profile for fear of provoking a reaction by the crowd. Several additional civilian leaders who were executed are to be cremated in a Hindustani ceremony on 14 December. A handbill is circulating in Paramaribo condemning Bouterse and some of his top military leaders for the killings. The handbill calls for guerrilla warfare against the military and demands that the Cubans leave the country. There is a backlash within the military to the executions. While there are no reports as yet of hostilities breaking out within the military, there will be trouble.  2. Two of the leading bishops in Paramaribo were arrested for a short period of time and released. They were interrogated about their discussions with officials of the Dutch Embassy.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
3. Reports of additional arrests are being received.  approximately 15 or more prisoners are being held by the military authorities.  the only reason the military has not executed these prisoners is because of the overwhelming negative attitude of the populace.  4. Suralco, the Alcoa bauxite company which is the most important company in Paramaribo, remains open but its smelter plant is closed down. On 13 December only 100 workers arrived at a plant employing 3,000. Suralco authorities have told the government that they will return to normal operations when the workers return.	25X1 25X1 25X1
	25X1

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- 5. Condemnation in the international press is growing, particularly in Western Europe. There are reports that a government in exile is being formed in the Hague in opposition to Bouterse.
- 6. Protests took place on 12 and 13 December in front of the Surinamese Embassy in the Hague.
- 7. During the night of 13 December, sporadic shots were heard, presumably fired by the military.
- 8. Four funerals of executed moderate opposition leaders were held on 13 December and were very heavily attended. Conservative estimate the number of attendees was 10,000.

25X1